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DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION OF HANDICAPPED
STUDENTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE LIMITATIONS
IMPOSED BY THE EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
INTRODUCTION

laws,1

State
as well as tradition, 2 confer upon schools the authority
to expel or suspend students whose behavior disrupts the orderly
operation of the education process. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA or Act), 3 however, prohibits
schools from changing or terminating the educational placement of a

1. Ala. Code § 16-1-14 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 14.30.045 (1980); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 15-841(b), -842(a) (1981 Special Pamphlet); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1516
(1980); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48900, 48904.5 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982); Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 22-33-105 to -106 (1974 & Supp. 1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-233c to -233d
(1981), amended by 1982 Conn. Legis. Serv. 320 (West); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§
228.041(25)-(26), 232.26 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 32-856 to
-857 (1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 298-11 (1976); Idaho Code §§ 33-205 to -206 (1981);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, The School Code § 10-22.6 (Smith-Hurd 1965 & Supp. 19821983); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 20-8.1-5-4 to -5 (Burns Supp. 1982); Iowa Code Ann. §
282.4 (West 1949); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8901 (1980), amended by 1982 Kan. Sess.
Laws 1305; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.150 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 17:223, :416 (West 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 473(5) (1965), repealed
and re-enacted 1982 Me. Legis. Serv. 30 (to be codified as tit. 20-A, § 1001(9),
effective July 1, 1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-304 (Supp. 1981); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 76, §§ 16-17 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1311
(Supp. 1982-1983); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 127.29(2) (West 1979); Miss. Code Ann. §§
37-7-301(e), (h), -9-71 (1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 167.161 (Vernon 1965); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 75-6310 to -6311 (1971); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-4,177 to -4,178, -4,180
(1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.467 (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:13 (1978); N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:37-2 to -2.1 (West 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. Educ. Law §
3214(3) (McKinney 1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-391 (1981); N.D. Cent. Code §§
15-29-08(13), -38-13 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66 (Page 1980); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 70, §§ 24-101 to -102 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981-1982); Or. Rev. Stat. §
339.250 (1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1318 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1982-1983);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-2-17 (1981); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 13-32-4 (1975 & Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1309
(1977 & Supp. 1981); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.301 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982);
Utah Code Ann. § 53-24-1(c) (1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1162 (1974 & Supp.
1982); Va. Code § 22.1-277 (1980); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 28A.58.101, .67.100
(1970 & Supp. 1982); W. Va. Code §§ 18A-5-1 to -la (1977 & Supp. 1982); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 120.13(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1981-1982); Wyo. Stat. § 21-4-305
(1977). Only Delaware, the District of Columbia and New Mexico do not have
statutory provisions concerning suspension or expulsion.
2. Even in those jurisdictions that do not have statutory provisions concerning
disciplinary exclusion, schools have the authority to expel or suspend students under
the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources
of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373, 377-82 (1969).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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handicapped child except through the formal "change of placement"
procedures set forth in the Act. 4 Consequently, when a handicapped
child becomes a discipline problem, school officials may find themselves faced with a legal dilemma. 5
It has been uniformly recognized that the EAHCA's change of
placement procedures impose limits on the power of school authorities
to expel or suspend handicapped children. 6 There is as yet no agreement, however, as to the extent and nature of these limits. 7 One
court has held that any non-emergency exclusion of a handicapped
student inherently violates the EAHCA. 8 This approach prevents the
interruption of a handicapped child's education by effectively exempting him from the disciplinary devices of suspension and expulsion. 9 To
the extent that this affords the handicapped child an unfair advantage
over nonhandicapped students, however, this approach may be subject to criticism on equal protection grounds. 10
4. Id. § 1415.
5. As one commentator has noted, "[s]tatute and case law indicate that there is
a conflict between the local school board's perception of its traditional power to
suspend or expel a student and the handicapped child's right to an appropriate

education." Lichtenstein, Suspension, Expulsion, and the Special Education Student,
61 Phi Delta Kappan, 459, 459 (1980); see S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347-48
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 566 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 22829 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1338
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 430-32
(D. Minn. 1979); Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634,
637 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-44 (D. Conn. 1978);
Southeast Warren Community School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 285
N.W.2d 173, 180 (Iowa 1979); cf. H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215 (D. Md.
1981) (parents claiming that schools' use of regular disciplinary procedures for handicapped students violates federal law).
6. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 566 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228-29 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Sherry v.
New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1338-39 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Mrs.
A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 430-32 (D. Minn. 1979);
Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 637 (S.D. Tex.
1978); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-44 (D. Conn. 1978); Southeast
Warren Community School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 285 N.W.2d
173, 180 (Iowa 1979). The limitation has also been recognized by the United States
Department of Education in its proposed regulation concerning "Disciplinary rules
and procedures" under the EAHCA. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. § 300.114) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
7. Compare Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242-43 (D. Conn. 1978)
(disciplinary exclusion of handicapped students inherently violates § 615 of the
EAHCA) with S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346, 350 (5th Cir.) (disciplinary
exclusion of handicapped pupils permissible unless handicap caused the misconduct),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 566 (1981) and Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228-29
(N.D. Ind. 1979) (same) and 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.114) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982) (same).
8. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978).
9. See C.E. Howe, Administration of Special Education 16 (1981).
10. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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A judicial desire to avoid the inherent unfairness of completely
immunizing all handicapped students from disciplinary exclusion has
resulted in the "cause of misconduct" approach." Under this approach, the EAHCA has been interpreted as prohibiting the disciplinary exclusion of a handicapped student only if an investigation shows
that the misconduct is a manifestation of his handicap.12 This approach has recently been adopted by the United States Department of
Education (DOE) in proposed regulation section 300.114.13
Under either interpretation of the limits imposed by the EAHCA on
school discipline, it is not clear whether formal diagnostic evaluation 14
must be complete before the benefits and protections of the EAHCA
can be afforded to a particular child. 5 At least one court has held
that a child receives no protection under section 615 of the Act prior to
completion of the formal evaluation process even when it is obvious
that the child is, in fact, handicapped. 16 A similar position may be
inferred from the language of the currently effective DOE regulation
defining "handicapped children" for purposes of the EAHCA.1 7 Under this mechanistic approach, a child who is handicapped, but who
has not been formally identified as such, can be expelled or suspended
from school even though his misconduct is actually caused by his
handicap. "8
The "cause of misconduct" approach is concededly the better interpretation of the EAHCA's impact on disciplinary exclusion of handicapped students. This Note suggests, however, that further develop-

11. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
12. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 566
(1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979); 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854
(1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
13. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114) (proposed
Aug. 4, 1982).
14. Regulations promulgated pursuant to EAHCA describe the basic evaluation
procedures to be followed. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530-.534, 300.540-.543 (1981).
15. Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 432 (D. Minn.
1979); Colley, The Educationfor all Handicapped Children Act (EHA) A Statutory
and Legal Analysis, 10 J.L. & Educ. 137, 160 (1981).
16. Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 432 (D. Minn.
1979).
17. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1981). " '[H]andicapped children' means those children evaluated in accordance with [specified procedures as being handicapped]". Id.
18. This is precisely what occurred in Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478
F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn. 1979), which concerned an eighth-grade student who had a
known history of behavior problems when she was suspended from school for fifteen
days. The student had been recommended for evaluation and placement as a handicapped student and was awaiting the results of previously administered psychological
and educational assessment tests. The court held that even though the test results
were expected to indicate that the student's behavior reflected an underlying handicapping condition, the child would be treated as normal until the results were in. Id.
at 430-32.
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ment and expansion of this approach is necessary in order to give full
effect to the broad remedial purposes of the EAHCA. 9 The "cause of
misconduct" approach, as currently applied, fails to provide change of
placement protection for children who misbehave because of undetected handicaps or who are awaiting formal evaluation.2 0 This Note
contends that both congressional intent and the express language of
the EAHCA require that all serious discipline problems be treated as
possible indications of an underlying handicapping condition. This
Note therefore suggests that, before any child is expelled or suspended,
due process requires that his parents be informed of their right to
demand an evaluation to determine whether their child's behavior is
the manifestation of an underlying handicap. If parents make such a
demand, even after commencement of disciplinary proceedings, the
child should be afforded the full protection of the EAHCA.
I.

EXPULSION AND SUSPENSION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In virtually every school system in this country, exclusion from
school is considered an appropriate and reasonable punishment for at
least some forms of student misconduct. 2' Two major rationales
support the use of exclusion from school as a punishment for breaking
school regulations. First, the school has a duty to protect students
22
from the dangerous or disruptive actions of their fellow students.
Presumably, this is the most effective way to maintain an orderly
setting that is conducive to learning. 23 Second, the school, as an
important socializing force in the lives of its students, must express

19. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Statement of Purpose, 20
U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. IV 1980); S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-9, 32,

reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1429-33, 1456.
20.
1979);
21.
22.

See Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 432 (D. Minn.
Colley, supra note 15, at 160.
See supra note I and accompanying text.
E.g., Fortman v. Texarkana School Dist. No. 7, 514 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ark.

1974); In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 324, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682, 684 (1972);
Southeast Warren Community School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 285

N.W.2d 173, 180 (Iowa 1979); Clements v. Board of Trustees, 585 P.2d 197, 204
(Wyo. 1978); R.E. Phay, The Law of Suspension and Expulsion: An Examination of
the Substantive Issues in Controlling Student Conduct 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
R.E. Phay I]; R.E. Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions and Expul-

sions 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R.E. Phay II]; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 387;
see S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 566
(1981).
23. R.E. Phay I, supra note 22, at 7, 61; R.E. Phay II, supra note 22, at 4-5; see
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 230 (N.D.
Ind. 1979); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 664-65 (D. Neb. 1972); Davis v.
Ann Arbor Pub. Schools., 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1226 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Goldstein,
supra note 2, at 420.
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social condemnation of certain
behavior by banishing rule-breakers
24

from the school community.

Disciplinary exclusion takes two general forms: suspension and expulsion. Suspension is a temporary loss of the right to attend school,

usually for a fixed period2 5 or, occasionally, until the student conforms

to the demands of the school administration.26 Most suspensions are
short-term, ten days or less. 27 Expulsion, on the other hand, is a
permanent or long-term exclusion from school.2 8
It is the most
serious sanction that school authorities can impose upon a student.29
Many states now limit the length of time a student may be deprived of
the right to attend school; 30 therefore expulsion usually means the
24. See Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) (school
officials defended expulsion of pregnant high school student on ground that if they
allowed her to remain in school, other students "might be led to believe that the
school authorities are condoning premarital relations"); Goldstein, supra note 2, at
391, 394-95.
25. E.g., E.C. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary Practices 96 (1976);
E.T. Connors, Student Discipline and the Law 14 (1979); E.G. Gee & D.J. Sperry,
Education Law and the Public Schools: A Compendium, at E-40 to E-41 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Compendium].
26. Alaska Stat. § 14.30.047(b) (1980) (readmission only when "cause [for suspension] has been remedied"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416(A) (West 1982) (student
guilty of vandalism shall not be readmitted until restitution made); R.I. Gen. Laws §
16-2-17 (1981) (student may be suspended "during pleasure" of school committee);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1309(c) (1977 & Supp. 1981) (suspended student must apply
for readmission); W. Va. Code § 18-8-8 (1977) (readmission may be refused until
child complies with school's requirements); see Ring v. Reorganized School Dist. No.
3, 609 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (indefinite suspension held not "cruel
and unusual punishment"). But see Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307, 310-11
(D.N.H. 1972) (indefinite suspension violates substantive due process and causes
irreparable harm to student).
27. See, e.g., E.T. Connors, supra note 25, at 16-17; Compendium, supra note
25, at E-40 to E-41.
28. E.C. Bolmeier, supra note 25, at 96; E.T. Connors, supra note 25, at 20;
Compendium, supra note 25, at E-41; McClung, The Problem of Due Proces3
Exclusion: Do Schools Have a Continuing Responsibility to Educate Children with
Behavior Problems?, 3 J.L. & Educ. 491, 492 (1974).
29. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974); E. T.
Connors, supra note 25, at 20; McClung supra note 28, at 504; Comment, Due
Process in the Public Schools-An Analysis of the Procedural Requirements and a
Proposalfor Implementing Them, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 641, 649-50 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Due Process].
30. Cal. Educ. Code § 48905 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982) (current plus following
semester); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-33-105(2)(c) (1974) (current school year); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 10-233a(e) (1981) (180 consecutive school days); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
228.041(26) (West Supp. 1981) (remainder of term plus one additional school year);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8902(a) (1980) (current school year); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
127.27(5) (West 1979) (current school year); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-4,179(2) (1981)
(current semester); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3214(3)(3)(e) (McKinney 1981) (only if over
compulsory school age; otherwise must have alternate education); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 15-29-08(13) (1981) (current term); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66(E) (Page 1980)
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maximum period of exclusion allowed by state law. Suspension is
ordinarily imposed by a school official,31 while expulsion usually requires action by the local school board.
A. The Due Process Rights of Public School Students
Schools generally are afforded considerable discretion in regulating
student behavior, especially in determining what punishment is to be
imposed for a particular offense. 32 If school regulations are reasonable, courts traditionally have deferred to school authorities' judgment in the choice of disciplinary sanctions. 33 Recently, however, as
courts have come to recognize that public education is a right as well
as a privilege, 34 they have begun to apply independent judicial review
35
to school disciplinary practices.
(current semester); Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.250(5)-(6) (1981) (current semester or current year); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-240 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (normally current year
but "incorrigible[s]" may be permanently expelled); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 13-324 (1975 & Supp. 1981) (current school year); Wyo. Stat. § 21-4-305(d) (1977) (one
school year).
31. E.C. Bolmeier, supra note 25, at 96; Compendium, supra note 25, at E-41 to
E-42.
32. E.C. Bolmeier, supra note 25, at 95; McClung, supra note 28, at 493 & n.3.
33. For many years courts adhered so strictly to the tradition of deference in
matters pertaining to school discipline that expulsions were upheld for such minor
offenses as a girl's wearing makeup to school, Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250
S.W. 538 (1923), or a boy's wearing metal heel plates on his shoes. Stromberg v.
French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1931). In recent times, courts often have been
unwilling to interfere even when a school's disciplinary policies bordered on oppressive. For example, courts have refused to intervene on behalf of Indian boys expelled
for wearing their hair in traditional long braids, New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480
F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), a boy expelled for refusing,
on grounds of conscience, to participate in ROTC training, Sapp v. Renfroe, 372 F.
Supp. 1193 (N.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975), or a boy suspended
for wearing an armband emblazoned with anti-war slogans. Wise v. Sauers, 345 F.
Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973). The prevailing
judicial attitude may be summed up as follows: "Since the school board [has] authority to mete out punishment, judicial belief that the punishment [is] too harsh does not
warrant 'mixing in.' . . . [A] laissez-faire policy must be observed by the courts."
Tucson Pub. Schools v. Green, 17 Ariz. App. 91, 94-95, 495 P.2d 861, 864 (1972); see
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3052 (1982); Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1978); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 42 (1973); McClung, supra note 28, at 493 & n.3. Even when courts have
found it necessary to restrict the power of school boards and officials in the area of
school discipline, they commonly have expressed reluctance and regret at having to
do so. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243
(D. Conn. 1978); R.E. Phay I, supra note 22, at 5-6.
34. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 664 (D. Neb. 1972);
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In 1975, the Supreme Court determined in Goss v. Lopez 3 that, by
providing free public education and enacting compulsory attendance
laws, a state confers a property right upon students. 37 Under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, a state may not deprive
any person of property without due process of law. 38 Accordingly, in
Goss the Court overturned a state statute that permitted imposition of
short-term suspension from school at the sole discretion of an individual school official. 39 The Court held that no student could be suspended for any period beyond one day without due process-notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 40 For suspensions of ten days or less,
an informal due process procedure was held to be a sufficient safeguard of students' rights. The Court suggested, however, that expulMills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Fielder v. Board of
Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Neb. 1972); Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307,
310-11 (D.N.H. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam). The concept of public
education as a property right grew out of the line of "new property" cases beginning
with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970). The basic premise in "new
property" cases is that once conferred, intangible government entitlements cannot be
revoked without due process. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
(loss of prisoner's "good-time" credits); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (loss of state
employment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license);
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (loss of pension benefits). But see
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (state college
teaching position held not to be conferred entitlement).
35. Perhaps the earliest decision to require due process in school suspensions was
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961), which overturned the summary suspension of college students for participating in a civil rights protest. The due process requirement did not develop more
fully until the late 1960's and early 1970's. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
576 n.8, 580 (1975); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir.
1974); Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973);
Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 602 (D.N.H.), vacated on other grounds,
502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 666 (D. Neb.
1972); Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722, 730 (D. Neb. 1972); DeJesus v.
Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 77 (D. Conn. 1972); Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp.
307, 311 (D.N.H. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388,
1392-93 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416,
419 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Esteban v.
Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd, 415
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). As these cases indicate,
"the belief is growing [that suspension and expulsion] violate the rights of both the
public-which, in its own interest, instituted the schools and made attendance at
E. Ladd, Students' Rights
them compulsory-and of the individual student .
and Discipline 15 (1975).
36. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
37. Id. at 573-74.
38. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. 419 U.S. at 584.
40. Id. at 579-84.
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sion or suspension for more than ten days would require a formal,
adversarial procedure. 41 Today, therefore, before any child can be
excluded from school for disciplinary reasons, he must be afforded
adequate notice of the complaint, presented with evidence against
him and informed of his right to a 4hearing
at which he may present
2
mitigating or exculpatory evidence.
B. Special Protection of HandicappedStudents
Exclusion from school is not always a disciplinary measure. In the
past, schools' unwillingness or inability to meet the special needs of
handicapped students was considered adequate justification for excluding many handicapped students from public schools. 43 Prior to
the landmark decisions of PennsylvaniaAssociationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania44 and Mills v. Board of Education,45 and the

41. Id. at 579-84.
42. See, e.g., Montoya v. Sanger Unified School Dist., 502 F. Supp. 209, 213
(E.D. Cal. 1980); Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 423, 426
(D. Minn. 1979). Many states have enacted due process provisions in their statutes
governing disciplinary exclusion. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-843 (1981 Special Pamphlet); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48901, 48903, 48914 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 22-33-105(2)(c) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-233c(a),-233d(a) (1981),
amended by 1982 Conn. Legis. Serv. 320 (West); Idaho Code § 33-205 (1981); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 122, The School Code § 10-22.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); Ind.
Code Ann. § 20-8.1-5-8 (Burns Supp. 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8902(b) (1980),
amended by 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws 1305-07; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.150(2) (BobbsMerrill 1980); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416 (West 1982); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 76, §
17 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.28, .31 (West 1979); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 167.161 (Vernon Supp. 1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-4,177(3), -4,178(3),
-4,181 to -4,205 (1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.467(2) (1980); N.Y. Educ. Law §
3214(3)(c)-(e) (McKinney 1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66(B) (Page 1980); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1318 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 59-63230, -240 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 13-32-4 (Supp. 1981);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1309(C) (1977); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.301 (Vernon 1972
& Supp. 1982); Va. Code § 22.1-277 (1980); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§
28A.58.101(2), .04.132 (Supp. 1982); W. Va. Code § 18A-5-la (b), (d), (e), (f)
(Supp. 1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 120.13(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1982-1983); Wyo.
Stat. § 21-4-305 (1977).
43. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3043 (1982); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1266 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (per curiam); S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1432; 121 Cong. Rec. 19,486 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Williams); id. at 19,494 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 19,502 (remarks of Sen.
Cranston); J. Kranes, The Hidden Handicap 15 (1980); H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P.
Turnbull, Free Appropriate Public Education-Law and Implementation 19-20
(1978); Colley, supra note 15, at 137-38; Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's
Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate
Mainstreaming, 54 Ind. L.J. 1, 2 (1978).
44. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam).
45. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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enactments of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197346 and the
from school was a comEAHCA, 47 exclusion of handicapped 4children
8
mon and rarely challenged practice.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education,49 the Supreme Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require that
public education be made available to all on an equal basis.i0 It was
not until nearly twenty years later that Congress expressly extended
the right of equal access to education to handicapped students in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1 Under section 504, no
institution or program that receives federal funds may exclude any
handicapped person "solely by reason of his handicap. '52 The implications of this provision are broad, but the area most profoundly
affected is public education. Section 504, as interpreted by the regulaall handicapped
tions promulgated thereunder, 53 codifies the right of
54
children to a "free, appropriate public education."
To comply with the Rehabilitation Act, the public school system of
each state must make affirmative efforts to identify, evaluate and
educate all handicapped children within its jurisdiction. 55 In order to
ensure the availability of an appropriate educational program for

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (commonly referred to as "§ 504.")
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).

52. Id.
53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-.39 (1981). These regulations were promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services to "effectuate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." Id. § 84.1.
54. Id. § 84.33. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1)(i) defines "appropriate education" as
that which is "designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons
In order to
I..."Id.
as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met .
be "appropriate," education must take place in the "least restrictive," that is, most
"normal," setting capable of meeting a particular handicapped child's special needs.
The requirement of "free appropriate public education" places a heavy burden on
states and school systems. Courts, however, have not hesitated to enforce these
requirements regardless of their accompanying financial burden. See, e.g., Sherry v.
New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1338-39 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Barnes
v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638-39 (D.S.C. 1977). The Supreme Court
has held, however, that the Rehabilitation Act does not prohibit an educational
institution from requiring "reasonable physical qualifications for admission to a
clinical training program." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
414 (1979) (deaf applicant denied admission to nursing program on ground she could
not safely perform in hospital setting). See generally H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P.
Turnbull, supra note 43, at 137-56.
55. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.32, .35 (1981).
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every handicapped child, schools must provide a continuum of possible educational settings or "placements" ranging from regular classroom instruction supplemented with specialized tutoring for a mildly
handicapped child to a highly restrictive residential care facility for a
6
severely handicapped child.2. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
The broad right of handicapped children to an appropriate education is codified in the Rehabilitation Act . 5 7 Specific procedures for
implementing and protecting that right are set forth in section 615 of
the EAHCA. 58 Compliance with the EAHCA is not mandatory, but
is instead a condition to receiving federal funds specifically earmarked
to help offset the tremendous costs of identifying, evaluating and
educating all handicapped children. 59 To qualify for funds under the
EAHCA, a state must submit a plan that satisfies detailed requirements governing the methods to be used in evaluating the nature and
extent of a child's handicap and the system by which a handicapped
child is to be placed in an appropriate educational setting.60 The
EAHCA requires that whenever it appears that a school-age child 6 ' is
or may be handicapped, the child must be tested and evaluated to
determine the nature of the problem.6 2 After a diagnosis has been
made, a team of appropriate specialists must meet with the child's
parents and teacher to develop a detailed, written "individualized
education plan" (IEP) .3
Section 615 of the EAHCA establishes a system of due process
protections for children undergoing either initial evaluation or a
change in a previously established IEP. 64 Initiation or alteration of
an IEP requires detailed notice to the child's parents.6 5 If the parents

56. Id. § 84.33-.34. See generally H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P. Turnbull, supra
note 43, at 137-56.
57. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
59. Id.; see Board of Edue. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3037 (1982).

60. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.110-.240 (1981).

61. The EAHCA specifically requires the provision of free, appropriate public
education
for all handicapped children between the ages of three and twentyone .

.

. except that, with respect to handicapped children aged three to

five and aged eighteen to twenty-one, inclusive, the requirements of this
clause shall not be applied in any State if the application of such requirements would be inconsistent with State law or practice.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976).
62. Id. § 1412(5)(C); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.128(a), .530-.532, .540-.543 (1981).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-.349 (1981).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
65. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(C).
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disagree with the proposed action, they are entitled to an impartial
administrative hearing as well as an appeal to the state educational
67
agency. 66 If still not satisfied, they may seek relief in the courts.
Throughout the hearing and appeals process, the child must be per68
mitted to remain in his current educational placement.
Moreover, whenever the parents of a handicapped child present
complaints "with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement" of their child, they are entitled
to the same hearing and appeals process.6 9 Thus, parents who are
aware of their rights under the EAHCA have a potent weapon against
school authorities who either attempt to change or refuse to change a
handicapped child's educational program for any reason other than
the best interests of the child.
II. THE PROBLEM OF EXPELLING OR SUSPENDING
HANDICAPPED STUDENTS

When a handicapped child misbehaves in school, a conflict may
arise between state laws permitting the imposition of disciplinary
exclusion as a punitive measure,7 0 and section 615 of the EAHCA,

which prohibits schools from unilaterally removing a handicapped
student from his current educational placement. 71 Neither the
EAHCA itself nor the currently effective regulations thereunder specifically provide for disciplinary action against handicapped students. 72 Nevertheless, it has been consistently recognized that the
EAHCA's change of placement procedures limit the power of school
authorities to expel or suspend handicapped students. 73 There is as
yet no consensus, however, as to the precise nature or extent of the
74
limitation.

66. Id. § 1415(b)(2), (c)-(d); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506-.510 (1981).
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(1), (2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1981).

68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1981). This "stay put"
provision has been interpreted as prohibiting parents, as well as school officials, from
unilaterally changing the child's placement during the pendency of a dispute. Stemple v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
911 (1981); see Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978). This
requirement, however, does not prevent the emergency removal of an extremely
disruptive or dangerous handicapped child pending alternative placement. 34
C.F.R. § 300.513 comment (1981); see Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D.
Ind. 1979); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1336
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D. Conn. 1978);
Southeast Warren Community School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 285
N.W.2d 173, 180 (Iowa 1979).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E), (b)(2) (1976).
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72. See H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P. Turnbull, supra note 43, at 70.
73. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. The Stuart Approach
75

Stuart v. Nappi presented the first opportunity for a federal district court to interpret the effect of the EAHCA on the power of school
officials to suspend or expel a handicapped student. The Stuart court
held that any disciplinary expulsion of a handicapped student violates
the change of placement provisions of the Act, and is therefore in.valid. 70 The court expressed concern that "[t]he right to an education
in the least restrictive environment may be circumvented if schools are
permitted to expel handicapped children. ' 77 Thus, the court held
that section 615 change of placement procedures "replace expulsion as
a means of removing handicapped children from school if they become disruptive. ' 78 This holding reflects an apparent judicial determination that retaining handicapped children in appropriate educa79
tional placements is a goal of such importance that expulsion 8and
child. 0
a
handicapped
suspension are never valid punishments for

75. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
76. Id. at 1241-43.
77. Id. at 1242.
78. Id.
79. The legislative history of the EAHCA states that "[t]his Nation has long
embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appropriate public education is basic
to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the future and the prosperity of our
people." S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1425, 1433. The importance of full education for handicapped children
in the least restrictive environment has been emphasized repeatedly by courts. See,
e.g., Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981),
vacated, 102 S.Ct. 3504 (1982); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F.
Supp. 869, 875, 877 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263, 1276-78 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp.
583, 597, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243
(D. Conn. 1978). Courts have expressly ruled that a claimed lack of funds or facilities
is no excuse for failure to provide appropriate education and services to handicapped
students. See Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 912 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Sherry v.
New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1339 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Lora v.
Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1292-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Barnes v. Converse College, 463 F. Supp. 635,
638-39 (D.S.C. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 189 (S.D.W. Va.
1976); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
80. As the Stuart court pointed out, "expulsion has the effect not only of changing a student's placement, but also of restricting the availability of alternative
placements." Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242-43 (D. Conn. 1978); see
Southeast Warren Community School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 285
N.W.2d 173, 180 (Iowa 1979). Thus, "the bottom line must be that no matter how
disruptive or irritating a child's behavior, s(he) still has a right to education."
McClung, supra note 28, at 527. The Stuart court acknowledged that extremely
disruptive or dangerous children should be removed on an emergency basis during
the formal change of placement process. 443 F. Supp. at 1243; accord Doe v. Koger,
480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479
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The Stuart decision was plainly intended to give handicapped children the greatest possible protection against interruption or termination of their individualized educational programs. At the same time,
however, by effectively exempting handicapped students from disciplinary exclusion, the Stuart approach unfairly insulates handicapped
students from punishments that are routinely applied to nonhandicapped students. Some educators have vigorously objected that Stuart
would create an unfair double standard in school discipline.8
Beyond simple unfairness, the double standard inherent in Stuart
potentially conflicts with the constitutional principal of equal protection.8 2 Although the United States Supreme Court has refused to
elevate education to the status of a fundamental right,8 3 it has clearly
recognized that education is an important interest. 84 Unequal treatment in imposing disciplinary exclusion on handicapped and
nonhandicapped students can therefore be justified only by a showing
that such treatment is rationally related to a substantial public purpose.85 While educating the handicapped is clearly a substantial pubF. Supp. 1328, 1336 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). This is a significant part of the opinion
because it makes clear that Stuart was not intended to protect handicapped children
at the expense of others. This assumes, however, the possibility of a swift change of
placement process so that the emergency suspension period would not be long enough
to constitute an invalid change of placement. This assumption appears unrealistic in
light of the commonly found backlog of children awaiting evaluation. Moreover,
evaluation is considered prompt if it is completed within 30 days after referral. U.S.
Department of Education, Fourth Annual Report to Congress on Implementation of
Public Law 94-142: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act 51-52 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Fourth Annual Report]. An emergency suspension of 30 days
would probably be considered excessively long under the EAHCA. See Sherry v. New
York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
81. C.E. Howe, supra note 9, at 15-16.
82. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution requires that "no State shall
...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2397 (1982); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
84. See Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2397-98 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). But see Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039, 1047
(N.D. Mo. 1977).
85. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982). The term "substantial public
interest" indicates the newly emerging standard of intermediate equal protection
scrutiny. See id. at 2395 & n.16; Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976); id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Intermediate scrutiny is to be distinguished
from the more firmly established standards of equal protection scrutiny: "rational
basis" and "strict scrutiny." Under the "rational basis" test, governmental classifications that lead to unequal treatment of particular persons or groups are considered
constitutional if they bear a rational relation to the furtherance of a legitimate public
purpose. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); RaiRvay
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lic purpose,8 6 it is questionable whether granting every handicapped
child complete immunity from disciplinary exclusion bears a rational
relation to furthering that purpose. In fact, the very principle underlying the EAHCA "mainstreaming '' 87 requirement is that handicapped students should be treated as much as possible like their nonhandicapped counterparts.8 8 Particularly in view of the presumed
educational and deterrent value of disciplinary exclusion,89 handicapped students should not be automatically exempt from expulsion
and suspension. At the same time, formulating a precise standard for
determining whether a particular handicapped student may be validly expelled has proved to be a difficult task.
B. The "Cause of Misconduct" Approach
Although the Stuart approach has never been challenged directly on
equal protection grounds, subsequent interpretations of the EAHCA's

Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled,
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973); Tanner v.
Little, 240 U.S. 369, 382 (1916); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe, 184 U.S. 540, 560
(1902). "Strict scrutiny," on the other hand, which requires a showing of a compelling state interest, is applied only when governmental classification either impinges
upon a "fundamental right," see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), or disadvantages a "suspect class." See, e.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298
(1955); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
86. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3037-40 (1982);
Frankel v. Commissioner of Edue., 480 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lora
v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School
Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 641 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp.
866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam).
87. The term "mainstreaming" is used to refer to the goal of integrating all
handicapped children in regular classes to the maximum extent possible. See, e.g.,
H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P. Turnbull, supra note 43, at 137; Miller & Miller, supra
note 43, at 1.
88. The EAHCA requires that "to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from
the regular educational environment occurs only when . . . education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(b) (1976); see id. § 1414; 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1981); H.R.
Turnbull, III & A.P. Turnbull, supra note 43, at 137-44; Colley, supra note 15, at

148; Note, Enforcing The Right to An "Appropriate"Education: The Education For
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1118-20 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Enforcing the Right].
89. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
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effect on disciplinary exclusion reveal an implicit concern with fairness and equal protection.9 0 As a result, the current trend is toward
the position that expulsion or suspension of a handicapped student is
prohibited only if the student's misconduct is found to have been
caused by the handicapping condition. 91
In August, 1982, the United States Department of Education proposed new regulations under the EAHCA, 92 including, for the first
time, a regulation governing disciplinary actions against handicapped
students.9 3 The proposed discipline regulation essentially incorporates the judicially created "cause of misconduct" approach. Under
the "cause of misconduct" approach, whenever a handicapped child
becomes subject to disciplinary exclusion, a determination must be
made as to whether the child's misbehavior was caused by his handicap. 94 If so, the child is afforded the protection of section 615.1 5 If
not, suspension or expulsion may be imposed in the same manner as
for a nonhandicapped child.9 6 Although the courts have not established clear standards for determining the cause of particular misconduct, 97 under the proposed regulation, the "cause of misconduct"
determination would be made according to procedures98 "consider[ed]
appropriate" by the state or local board of education.

90. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
566 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979); cf. Sherer v.
Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (court refused to require unusual
services for handicapped, which are not provided to nonhandicapped); Colley, supra
note 15, at 152 (questions whether EAHCA "works a reverse discrimination"); Enforcing the Right, supra note 88, at 1107 n.33 (considers problem of children claiming EAHCA protection to thwart disciplinary exclusion).
91. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
566 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979); 47 Fed Reg.
33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(c)) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
92. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,835 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
93. Id. at 33,854 (proposed regulation § 300.114).
94. Id. (proposed regulation § 300.114(c)).
95. Id. (proposed regulation § 300.114(c)(2)).
96. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
566 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979); 47 Fed. Reg.
33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(c)(3) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
97. For example, in Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979), the court
stated that the determination of whether a handicapped child's misbehavior was
caused by his handicap "must be determined through the change of placement
procedures required by the [EAHCA]." Id. at 229. This statement is confusing
because the section 615 change of placement procedure is neither intended nor suited
for use as a vehicle for testing a handicapped child's ability to refrain from proscribed
behavior. Rather, it is specifically intended to determine whether a change in educational placement would better serve a particular handicapped child's special needs.
98. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(c)(1))
(proposed Aug. 4, 1982). As used in proposed regulation § 300.114(c)(1), the term
"agency" includes "the State educational agency, a local educational agency, or an
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The cause of misconduct approach is emerging as the dominant
interpretation of the EAHCA's impact on disciplinary exclusion of
handicapped children."" Thus, understanding both the reasoning
that gave rise to this approach and the negative effects that might
result from its uncritical adoption is important.
1. Development of the "Cause of Misconduct" Rationale
The position that the EAHCA prohibits disciplinary exclusion of a
handicapped student only if the handicap is found to be the cause of
the misconduct originated in the case of Doe v. Koger. 00 In arriving
at its "cause of misconduct" approach, the Koger court reasoned that
"[i]t is not the purpose of the [EAHCA] to provide handicapped
students placement which will guarantee their education despite the
students' will to cause trouble."' 0 '
0 2
Subsequently, in S-i v. Turlington,1
the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to refine and develop the
rationale underlying the "cause of misconduct" approach. The
Turlington case concerned nine mentally retarded children who challenged their total exclusion from public school. 0 3 The exclusions had4
0
been effected in accordance with basic due process requirements.
With the exception of one student, however, the plaintiffs had been
afforded neither a change of placement hearing nor a hearing to
determine whether their misconduct was caused by their handi-

caps. 105
In adopting the "cause of misconduct" position, the Fifth Circuit
relied upon the Rehabilitation Act's mandate that a student may not
be excluded "solely by reason of his handicap."1 06 The court reasoned
that in order to determine whether disciplinary exclusion would violate the Rehabilitation Act, school officials must ascertain whether a
10 7
handicapped child's misconduct is a manifestation of his handicap.

intermediate educational unit, and any other public institution or agency in the State
which is responsible for providing education to handicapped children." Id. §
300.4(9).
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
101. Id. at 229.
102. 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 566 (1981).
103. The children were all classified as educable or mildly mentally retarded.
None was considered emotionally disturbed. The misconduct upon which the expulsions were based ranged from masturbation or sexual acts toward other students to
defiance of authority, insubordination, vandalism and use of profane language. Id.
at 344 & n.1.
104. Id. at 344 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 345-46 (quoting Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1973)).
107. 635 F.2d at 346, 348.
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If so, the child cannot be expelled.10 8 Instead, he must be given a
change of placement to an educational setting that is better suited to
handling students whose handicaps cause them to misbehave. 09 By
clear implication, if a handicapped student's misbehavior is determined not to be caused by his handicapping condition, disciplinary
exclusion could be imposed upon the handicapped child to the same
extent that it could be imposed upon a nonhandicapped child." 0
Although it expressly approved the Stuart opinion,"' the
Turlington court apparently believed that it could not go as far in
insulating handicapped children from expulsion. The court considered
itself bound by state education law, which specifically permitted
expulsion as a "disciplinary tool for all students.""n 2 This deferential
attitude113 led the court to the conclusion that "expulsion is still a
proper disciplinary tool under the [EAHCA] and section 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act] when proper procedures are utilized and under
proper circumstances." 14
The chief advantage of the "cause of misconduct" approach is that
it offers what appears to be a fair and logical solution to the equal
protection problem inherent in Stuart. Unlike Stuart, the "cause of
misconduct" cases do not create a personal exemption from disciplinary exclusion for all handicapped students. Rather, this approach
prevents the application of disciplinary sanctions only when the misconduct is an involuntary effect of the handicap. Thus, the cause of
misconduct approach provides the constitutionally necessary "rational
basis" for affording some handicapped children greater protection
against disciplinary exclusion than they would enjoy if they were not
handicapped.

108. Id.
109. See id. at 346.
110. This is precisely the approach taken by the DOE in the proposed regulation
concerning disciplinary actions against handicapped students. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854
(1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982).
111. 635 F.2d at 347.
112. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). The court was apparently alluding to Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 232.26 (West 1977), which expressly permits expulsion and suspension of
students.
113. For a discussion of the tradition of federal judicial deference in matters of
public education, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. 635 F.2d at 348. Despite this conclusion, the court stated that it would not
"authorize the complete cessation of educational services [to a handicapped child]
during an expulsion period." Id. This anomalous statement illustrates the confusion
inherent in the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. To say that it is possible to expel a handicapped child but not to deprive him of an education is virtually the same as saying
the child must be given an alternative educational placement. Yet the court held that
"change of placement protection" is to be afforded only to those handicapped students whose misconduct is found to have been caused by their handicaps. Id.
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2. Practical Problems Under the Cause of Misconduct Approach
Implicit in the "cause of misconduct" approach is the assumption
that causes of specific behavior can be isolated and identified." 5 In
fact, notwithstanding the tremendous advances in the ability of psychologists and special education professionals to diagnose many handicapping conditions, an exact determination of whether a particular
handicap causes specific behavior is often impossible to make.",
Therefore, any attempt to determine the cause of specific misconduct
is necessarily subjective and inexact.
The determination of whether particular misconduct was caused by
a handicap will often require expert testimony. Predictably, the outcome of such an inquiry will depend largely upon which party's expert
testifies more persuasively. A family that lacks the means to obtain
outside evaluations and expert testimony will be at a disadvantage in
defending its handicapped child's right to remain in an appropriate
educational setting.' ' 7 The proposed DOE regulation would perpetuate this problem by requiring that the "cause of misconduct" determination "involve persons who are familiar with the child and with the
behaviors associated with the handicapping condition." " 8
Moreover, the result of a "cause of misconduct" determination
depends to a large extent on how "cause" is defined. In Turlington, for
example, the Fifth Circuit took a broad view of causality, suggesting
that even the indirect effects of a handicapping condition should be
considered.1 9 The court cited the example of an orthopedically

handicapped boy whose extreme aggressiveness could be traced to the

115. See Colley, supra note 15, at 160.
116. Id. at 160; Levine & Oberklaid, Hyperactivity-Symptom Complex or Complex Symptom?, 134 Am. J. Disabilities in Children, 409, 410, 412 (1980); Lewis,
Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, Delinquency and Seizure Disorders:PsychomotorEpileptic
Symptomatology and Violence, in Vulnerabilities to Delinquency 51, 53 (D.O. Lewis
ed. 1981); Mauser, Learning Disabilitiesand Delinquent Youth, 9 Academic Therapy 389, 391-92 (1974).
117. See Enforcing the Right, supra note 88, at 1110-11. Both the Act and the
corresponding DOE regulations provide that parents shall have the right to "independent educational evaluation of [their] child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976);
34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1981). If parents avail themselves of the opportunity for an
independent evaluation, the school may challenge the independent findings. If the
school succeeds in establishing that its original evaluation was appropriate, however,
the parent loses the right to have independent evaluation at public expense. 34
C.F.R. § 300.503(b) (1981).
118. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.114) (proposed
Aug. 4, 1982).
119. 635 F.2d at 347; accord Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454
F. Supp. 634, 640 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education:Empirical Studies and ProceduralProposals, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 153 (1974). But see In re
Mecca, 82 Misc. 2d 497, 499, 369 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
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frustration he felt as a result of his condition.' 20 It was implied that in
such a case the child's aggressive behavior should be regarded as
having been caused by his handicap. 121 Under such a broad view of
causality, virtually any misconduct by a handicapped child can be
argued to have been "caused" by the handicap.12 2 Paradoxically, a
broad interpretation of "cause of misconduct" would effectively exempt handicapped children from disciplinary exclusion. This is prebe avoided by formulating the "cause of
cisely the result sought 2 to
3
misconduct" approach.1
A narrow view of causality, on the other hand, would reduce the
limitations imposed by the EAHCA on disciplinary exclusion of handicapped students. In effect, change of placement protection would be
afforded only when a handicapped child's misbehavior amounted to a
clinical symptom of the handicapping condition. In Turlington, for
example, the defendant school officials claimed that only a serious
emotional disturbance could be said to "cause" the kinds of misconduct attributed to the plaintiff children.124 Such a standard would
result in the disciplinary exclusion of many handicapped children
whose misbehavior is in fact caused, albeit indirectly, by their handicaps. This result would clearly contravene the intent, 12 5 if not the
letter, of the EAHCA.
C. The Evaluation Requirement
Whether the formal evaluation process must be complete before the
due process protections of the EAHCA can be invoked is as yet unclear. The definition of "handicapped children" in section 601 of the

120. 635 F.2d at 347.
121. Id. The defendant state and local education officials conceded that a handicapped child cannot be expelled for misconduct that is "a manifestation of the
handicap itself." They argued, however, that only a serious emotional disturbance
could "cause" a child to misbehave. The court firmly rejected this contention. Id. at
346-47.
122. See Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 636,
640 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa.
1976). One commentator has observed that "it seems clear that any behavior problem
which is found to be severe enough to justify the expulsion of a pupil ... almost by
definition is also severe enough to qualify the pupil for special educational placement." McClung, supra note 28, at 526 (emphasis in original); accord Kirp, Buss &
Kuriloff, supra note 119, at 153 ("A child who disrupts classes may just be misbehaving, but he may also be exhibiting the need for special educational assistance not
being provided."); cf. H.R. Turnbull, III & A.P. Turnbull, supra note 43, at 72
("Most children in correction or [juvenile] facilities can be diagnosed as seriously
emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, or otherwise handicapped.").
123. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
124. 635 F.2d at 346.
125. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8-9, 14, reprintedin 1975 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1430, 1432-33, 1438.
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EAHCA 12 1 clearly indicates that the Act is intended to protect those
who suffer from a handicap, and not, as has been argued, only those
who are officially identified as handicapped. 12 7 According to one
federal district court, however, EAHCA protection is predicated entirely upon a formal identification and evaluation of the child's handicap. In Mrs. A.J. v. Special School DistrictNo. 1,128 an eighth-grade
girl challenged a fifteen-day suspension that had been imposed while
she was awaiting the results of formal evaluation. 12 9 The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the basic due process mandated
for nonhandicapped students was inadequate in her case because she
was a handicapped student under the EAHCA. 130 The court held
that, even though it appeared likely that the forthcoming evaluation
would indicate that the plaintiff was a handicapped child entitled to
the full benefits of the EAHCA, until the test results were complete
she would be treated as nonhandicapped.' 31 The court reasoned that
because the EAHCA prescribes procedures for evaluating the nature
and extent of a handicap, only the results of those procedures 1 can
32
establish that a particular child is in fact a "handicapped child."
In the currently effective regulations promulgated under the
EAHCA,1 33 the Department of Education 134 appears to have taken a
position similar to that of the court in Mrs. A.J. Regulation section
300.5 defines "handicapped children" as "those children evaluated"
according to specified procedures as falling into one of the categories
enumerated in section 601 of the EAHCA.135 This administrative
interpretation arguably limits EAHCA protection to those children
who have been identified as handicapped before the commencement

of disciplinary action against them .136

126. According to § 601 of the EAHCA, "the term 'handicapped children' means
mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired
children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require

special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
127. See Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 432 (D. Minn.
1979); Colley, supra note 15 at 160; see also Enforcing the Right, supra note 88, at
1107 n.33 (discussing both sides of the question).
128. 478 F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn. 1979).
129. Id. at 422-23.
130. Id. at 432-33.
131. Id. at 430-32.
132. Id.
133. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.754 (1981).
134. Regulations implementing the EAHCA were initially promulgated by the

Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 45 C.F.R. pt. 121a (1979). All
regulatory functions under the EAHCA were transferred subsequently to the newly

formed Department of Education. Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 301, 93 Stat. 677, 677
(1979).
135. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1981) (emphasis added).
136. The new regulations proposed by the DOE would alter the definition to
correspond with the language of the Act. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,845 (to be codified at 34
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Under Mrs. A.J. and DOE regulation section 300.5, children awaiting EAHCA evaluation 37 or suffering from undetected handicaps 38
might be suspended or expelled without either an investigation into
the underlying cause of their misconduct or placement into a more
appropriate educational setting. The change of placement protections
of the EAHCA would be available only to those students previously
identified and evaluated as handicapped. Such a limitation may simplify the task of determining whether the EAHCA applies to a particular case, but it is inconsistent with congressional intent. 39
III.

IMPROVING THE "CAUSE OF MISCONDUCT" APPROACH

Notwithstanding the practical problems associated with the "cause
of misconduct" approach, 40 it offers the greatest potential for giving
broad effect to the EAHCA's change of placement provision without
conferring an unjust advantage upon handicapped students. The most
serious shortcoming of the "cause of misconduct" approach, as currently interpreted, is that it fails to account for the possibility that a
seemingly normal child can become a discipline problem because of a
C.F.R. § 300.4(4)) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982). This change does not appear to reflect a
policy decision by the DOE to extend any of the EAHCA protections to children who
are not evaluated. See id. at 33,837.
137. In many areas the waiting period between referral and evaluation is long. In
fact, reducing waiting lists for special education evaluation has been identified as the
"critical remaining challege" in implementation of EAHCA evaluation procedures.
Fourth Annual Report, supra note 80, at 51. A recent study shows that waiting
periods of 30 to 60 days are not uncommon. Id. at 52. Under a mechanistic approach
such as that espoused in Mrs. A.J., unevaluated handicapped students would remain
vulnerable to disciplinary exclusion long after their handicaps had become apparent
to teachers and school officials.
138. Ample evidence exists that extreme misbehavior in children often results from
a mental or neurological handicap that is not readily detected. See, e.g., J. Kranes,
The Hidden Handicap 48-49 (1980); Cantwell, Hyperactivity and Antisocial Behavior Revisited: A Critical Review of the Literature,in Vulnerabilities to Delinquency
21, 31 (D.O. Lewis ed. 1981); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 119 at 153; Levine &
Oberklaid, supra note 116, at 413; Lewis, Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, supra note 116,
at 51-53; Mauser, supra note 116 at 391-93; McClung, supra note 28, at 526; McKay
& Brumback, Relationship Between LearningDisabilitiesand Juvenile Delinquency,
51 Perceptual & Motor Skills 1223, 1225 (1980); Weiss & Hechtman, The Hyperactive Child Syndrome, 205 Sci. 1348, 1348-49, 1353 (1979). The uncertain state of
expert opinion as to what "causes" bad behavior in children is illustrated by the fact
that some experts still reject the premise that a causal connection exists between, for
example, learning disabilities and juvenile delinquency. See D. Offer, R.C. Marohn
& E. Ostrov, The Psychological World of the Juvenile Delinquent 145-52 (1979).
139. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Statement of
Purpose, §§ 601(17), 612(c), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)(5), 1401(17), 1412(c) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13(b)(1)(i), (3), (12)(i), .128(a)(1) (1981); S. Rep.
No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1425, 1442.
140. See supra pt. II(B)(2).
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previously undetected handicapping condition.14 ' The only judicial
pronouncement on this point 42 expressly limits the EAHCA change of
placement protection to children who have been formally evaluated
and identified as handicapped.143 Schools, therefore, are under no
general obligation to investigate the possibility that particular misbehavior is caused by a handicap unless the child has already been
proven handicapped.144 Moreover, even if such an investigation is
performed, the school need not afford the child the protections of
section 615 until after the finding of a handicap. As a result, children
may still be expelled or suspended from school for conduct that is in
fact caused by a handicap. Such a result is contrary to the logic of the
"cause of misconduct" approach 45 and to the broad remedial goals of
46
the EAHCA.1
A solution to this problem would be to permit a formal evaluation
whenever any child faces disciplinary exclusion for misconduct that
might reasonably be attributed to an underlying handicap. During
the evaluation the child should be protected by the section 615 change
47
of placement procedures, including the "stay in place" provision.
Support for this proposition can be found in the opinion of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in Mills v. Board of
Education'4"49and in statutory provisions recently adopted by two state
legislatures.
According to its legislative history, enactment of the EAHCA was
prompted in large part by the Mills decision. 50 The Mills case concerned a group of mentally and emotionally handicapped children
who had been denied the right to attend public school because their
handicaps made them difficult to control.' 5' The court held that,

141. See supra pt. II(B)(3).
142. Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn. 1979).
143. Id. at 431.
144. Id.; see Colley, supra note 15, at 160; see also Enforcing the Right, supra
note 88 at 1107 n.33 (discussing both sides of the question).
145. Implicit in the "cause of misconduct" approach is the belief that wrongdoing
is punishable only if it is intentional. See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D.
Ind. 1979); cf. McClung, supra note 28, at 504 ("'[N]o rule is reasonable which
requires of the pupil what they cannot do."').
146. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Statement of Purpose, 20
U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. IV 1980); S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-9, 32,
reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1429-33, 1456.

147. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976).
148. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
149. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1311 (Supp. 1981-1982); W. Va. Code § 18A5-1a(e) (Supp. 1982).
150. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1430. See generally Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct.
3034, 3037 n.2 (1982) (discussion of the influence of Mills on enactment of EAHCA).
151. 348 F. Supp. at 868-70.
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under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 5 2 the District of
Columbia must provide "suitable publicly-supported education" to
every school-age child "regardless of the degree of the child's mental,
physical or emotional disability or impairment."'' 53 The court was
concerned particularly with preventing the use of disciplinary procedures as a way of evading the duty to educate handicapped children.1 54 As a result, the court ordered that no child could be expelled
or suspended for more than two days without due process, 55 including notice to the parents "that if the child is thought ... to require
special education . . . such child is eligible to receive, at no
charge . ..diagnostic .. .evaluation."'' 56 In addition, Mills required that the child be permitted to remain in school pending completion of diagnostic evaluation and hearings. 57 The Mills court thus
expressly found both that the right to evaluation of a possible handicapping condition may properly be invoked even after school officials
seek to expel or suspend a misbehaving child, and that this right
encompasses the right to remain in school until the cause of the child's
misconduct has been determined.
By requiring notice to parents that they are entitled to free diagnostic evaluation before disciplinary exclusion of their child, the MilLs
court wisely allowed for the possibility that disciplinary procedures
could serve indirectly as an effective additional mechanism for discovering cases of children who suffer from undetected handicaps. Recently, the soundness of this position has been recognized by the
legislatures of two states. Both Michigan15 8 and West Virginia 59 require schools to offer appropriate diagnostic testing to children who
become subject to disciplinary exclusion because of behavior that
might indicate an underlying handicap. 160 Prior to the completion of

152. Id. at 847-75 (construing U.S. Const. amend. V).
153. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
154. Several of the plaintiff children had been permanently expelled because of
their behavior problems. Id. at 868-70. The Mills court was therefore especially
concerned with the effect of disciplinary exclusion practices on handicapped children. Id. at 878-80; Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 119, at 153.
155. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
156. Id. at 882.
157. Id. at 883.
158. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1311 (Supp. 1981-1982).
159. W. Va. Code § 18A-5-la(e) (Supp. 1982).
160. The Michigan statute provides that when "there is reasonable cause to believe
that the pupil [who faces disciplinary exclusion] is handicapped, and the school
district has not evaluated the pupil in accordance with the rules [for evaluating
handicapped children] the pupil shall be evaluated immediately." Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 380.1311 (Supp. 1981-1982). The West Virginia statute is even more
comprehensive: "[I]f a pupil ... is eligible to be classified as [a handicapped child]
...his parent or custodial guardian may show an explanation of the actions complained of that such actions were the proximate result of a condition which . ..
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the testing and a determination of whether the child's misbehavior is
caused by a handicap, school officials are prohibited from expelling or
suspending the child.'10
Both the language and the legislative history of the EAHCA favor
requiring investigation of the possibility that a misbehaving child is, 6in2
fact, a handicapped child. In the EAHCA "Statement of Purpose," 1
Congress expressly acknowledged that "there are many handicapped
children .

.

. participating in regular school programs whose handi-

caps prevent them from having a successful educational experience
because their handicaps are undetected."16 3 The EAHCA therefore
requires states to implement procedures to locate and identify all
handicapped children within their respective jurisdictions. 164 Moreover, section 615 of the EAHCA states that "[w]henever a complaint
has been received [concerning identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child,] the parents or guardian shall have an
opportunity for an impartial due process hearing . .. . During the
pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section
. . . the child shall remain in the then current educational placement
It is submitted that this provision would encompass a
165
....
complaint by parents that their child is in need of special educational
services because of a handicap that school officials have failed to
detect. 166 Even if such a complaint were made after disciplinary
If the principal or
would qualify the pupil for a special educational program ....
[school] board finds that such actions were the proximate result of such a condition,
the pupil shall not be suspended or expelled . . . but the pupil shall be forthwith
referred to the appropriate personnel ... for development of an individual learning
program." W. Va. Code § 18A-5-la(e) (Supp. 1982). The West Virginia statute
expressly permits temporary removal of a very disruptive child during the period
necessary to set up a special education placement. Id. Illinois similarly requires that
the state "Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities shall be
invited to send a representative to consult with the [school] board . . . whenever
there is evidence that mental illness may be the cause for expulsion or suspension."
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
161. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1311 (Supp. 1982-1983); W. Va. Code § 18A5-la(e) (Supp. 1982).
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. IV 1980).
163. Id. § 1400(b)(5) (emphasis added). See supra note 122 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how this rationale might apply to children whose education is
hampered by undetected handicaps that cause them to become behavior problems in
school.
164. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(17), 1412 (c); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13(b)(1)(i), (3), (12)(i),
.128, .321(a)(1); see S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprintedin 1975 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1442.
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), (e)(3) (1976).
166. See Enforcing the Right, supra note 88, at 1107 n.33. In Frankel v. Commissioner of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held that during
pendency of a parental complaint for a school's failure to identify their child as
handicapped, the procedural protections of section 615 would apply. Id. at 1160.
Contra Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 414, 431 (D. Minn.
1979).
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proceedings had been instituted against the child, the "stay in place"
provision of section 615167 should prohibit disciplinary exclusion of the
child at least until after he is evaluated and the complaint resolved.
Expanding the "cause of misconduct" approach to include a requirement that all instances of serious student misconduct be treated as
potential indications of an undetected handicap would afford maximum EAHCA change of placement protection to all handicapped
children, whether previously identified or not, without creating a
double standard in school discipline.
Even if EAHCA change of placement protection is extended to
children whose misbehavior is caused by previously undetected handicaps, cases will continue to arise in which no empirical link can be
found between a handicap and particular misconduct. In such cases,
handicapped children will be subject to disciplinary exclusion to the
same extent as nonhandicapped students.168 This result preserves the
principles of fairness and equal protection in school discipline; however, insofar as it permits some handicapped children to be completely
deprived of appropriate public education, it fails to implement the
EAHCA goal of assisting all handicapped children to become selfsustaining and productive citizens. 69 Any long-term disciplinary exclusion causes harm both to the child and to society as a whole. 170 The
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976); see Enforcing the Right, supra note 88, at
1107 n.33.
168. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
169. In enacting the EAHCA, Congress determined that "[t]he long range implications of [statistics showing half of all handicapped children to be receiving no or
inadequate education] are that public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of
dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents
and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would
be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced
to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society." S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1433. Many of the
Congressional sponsors of the EAHCA espoused a similar goal: "[Providing appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to
become a contributing part of our society, and they will not have to depend on
subsistence payments from public funds." 121 Cong. Rec. 19,492 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Williams); accord 121 Cong. Rec. 25,541 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Harkin); 121
Cong. Rec. 37,024-25 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 Cong. Rec. 37,027
(1975) (remarks of Rep. Gude); 121 Cong. Rec. 37,410 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph); see Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3048 n.23 (1982); Gladys
J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
170. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir.
1974) (expulsion amounts to a "lifetime sentence to second rate citizenship"); Cook v.
Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307, 310 (D.N.H. 1972) (indefinite suspension causes "irreparable harm"); E.T. Connors, supra note 25, at 20 (expulsion compared to "educational capital punishment"); McClung, supra note 28, at 504 ("capital punishment
for misdemeanors"). See generally E.C. Bolmeier, supra note 25, at 136-39 (expulsion causes harm both to the student and to society); E. T. Ladd, supra note 35, at
15-16 (same); McClung, supra note 28, at 504-07 (same).
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detrimental effects, however, are more pronounced when the child
who is deprived of an education is handicapped. By definition, handicapped children require a greater concentration of educational and
remedial effort in order to progress.'71 Handicapped children, therefore, lose more than their nonhandicapped peers when they are expelled or suspended from school.172 Moreover, the loss to society, in
is greater
terms of decreased productivity and increased dependency,
1 73
when handicapped children are excluded from school.
A perfect solution to this problem may not be possible. The only fair
way to create an absolute right to education for handicapped children, regardless of whether they misbehave, would be to extend such
a right to all children. The Mills court sought to achieve this result by
stating that the District of Columbia was required to offer alternative
educational placements to all children, handicapped and nonhandi74
capped alike, who were expelled or suspended from public school.
Similarly, a few states have chosen to provide the opportunity for
alternate education for all students who are subject to disciplinary
exclusion from regular school. 175 As long as education is not consid171. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 601(1), 20
U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
172. See, e.g., Armstrongv. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 593-97 (E.D. Pa.) (extended
school year must be provided for handicapped children who would suffer substantial
educational setback if IEP interrupted over summer), afj'd in part, remanded in
part, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Howard S. v.
Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (consequences of not enjoining the effective expulsion of handicapped boy "could be
disastrous, and . . . could destroy [his] chances to lead a normal life").
173. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1433.
174. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The Mills court
ordered that, as an element of due process in all disciplinary exclusions, school
officials must "describe alternative educational opportunities to be available to the
child during the proposed suspension period." Id. at 882. Furthermore, a growing
body of opinion favors the provision of alternate education for any child expelled or
suspended from school. See, e.g., E.C. Bolmeier, supra note 25, at 136; Colley, supra
note 15, at 549; McClung, supra note 28, at 527; Due Process, supra note 29, at 649
n.75, 658.
175. Only five states clearly require that alternative education must be provided
for expelled or suspended students of compulsory school age. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10233d(c) (1981), amended by 1982 Conn. Legis. Serv. 320 (West) (must be offered to
children up to age 16; optional ages 16-18); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416.2 (West
1982) (must supervise and educate all suspended or expelled students if government
allocates funds); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.27(10), .29(1) (West 1979) (any student
suspended over 5 days or expelled); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3214(3)(e) (McKinney 1981)
(all students of compulsory school age); 22 Pa. Admin. Code § 12.6(h) (Shepard's
1982) (same). Several other states give the school board discretion to offer alternative
education or a rehabilitation program. Cal. Educ. Code § 48907.5 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1982) Fla. Stat. Ann. § 228.061(2)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 298.11 (1976); Iowa Code Ann. § 299.13 (West Supp. 1982-1983); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 59-63-250 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Va. Code § 22.1-279 (1980); W. Va. Code § 18A-51(a)(e) (Supp. 1982).
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ered a fundamental right,1 76 however, there can be no general requirement of uninterrupted education for any child, handicapped or
not.
CONCLUSION

In determining the circumstances under which handicapped children may be suspended or expelled from school, three important
factors must be considered: (1) the EAHCA's mandate that, to the
maximum extent possible, handicapped children must be placed and
retained in appropriate educational settings; (2) the practical necessity
for school officials to be able to exclude disruptive or disobedient
students; and (3) the basic principles of fairness and equal protection,
which demand that handicapped children not be afforded an unreasonable exemption from sanctions that are commonly imposed upon
their nonhandicapped peers. The "cause of misconduct" approach
offers a reasonable balance among these three elements. Even so, it is
not an entirely satisfactory solution to the problem of expelling and
suspending handicapped students.
The "cause of misconduct" approach reflects a belief that only
deliberate misconduct should be punished. Thus, this approach requires an investigation of whether particular misconduct by a handicapped child is in fact a manifestation of the handicap. Currently,
however, the duty to investigate the cause of particular misconduct
may be limited to cases in which the child has been diagnosed previously as handicapped. This limitation fails to account for the fact that
misbehavior is sometimes the first observable symptom of an undetected handicapping condition. When that is the case, application of
normal disciplinary exclusion procedures can result in the expulsion or
suspension of a child for behavior that was actually caused by a
handicap. Such a result plainly confounds the basic premise upon
which the "cause of misconduct" approach is based. Both the Department of Education and the courts, therefore, should expand the due
process requirements in school disciplinary proceedings to include an
opportunity for diagnostic evaluation of any seriously misbehaving
child while the child continues to receive an education.
Furthermore, the "cause of misconduct" approach, by definition,
permits disciplinary exclusion of any child who cannot demonstrate a
causal connection between his or her misconduct and a handicapping
condition. While this may comport with basic principles of fairness
and equal protection, it does so at the cost of punishing some handicapped children by depriving them of the special education necessary
to enable them to become self-sufficient, contributing citizens. It
should be recognized that the long-term consequence of suspending or
176. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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expelling a handicapped child is that society as a whole is punished by
being deprived of the increased productivity and decreased dependency of an optimally trained and educated handicapped population.
Unfortunately, short of imposing a nationwide requirement that all
children be provided with alternative educational services during periods of disciplinary exclusion, a remedy for this problem may not be
available.
Erica Bell

